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FRACKING IN A WORLD WITH FIDUCIARY DUTIES: A
SUGGESTION FOR THE FUTURE
OVERVIEW
Big businesses are regulated by a variety of sources. Depending on the
industry, influencers and regulators range from local municipalities to agencies
of the federal government. This Comment seeks to analyze the In re Clovis
Oncology, Inc. decision, and the clear message the majority opinion sends to
directors and agents of corporations: one’s fiduciary duties are indispensable
obligations, irrespective of the occupational field at issue. By applying the
Clovis principles to fracking companies, this Comment will encourage
proactive, dynamic, and bold directors to change their reporting requirements
before a shift in societal interests and concerns could expose them to liability.
Beginning with a brief introduction into Clovis itself, this Comment will
proceed by providing background information regarding fiduciary duties and the
momentous Delaware Caremark case, in which the court produced tests for
breaches of those obligations. The focus of the piece will then shift to the topic
of hydraulic fracturing by analyzing the federal and state provisions that are in
place to regulate the fracking industry, and the potential reverberations that the
industry may feel from the Clovis opinion. The main argument of this piece rests
on the idea that the regulations imposed on these large corporations, and
therefore the directors and agents of those companies, are negligible and leave
room for exploitation or abuse despite extreme environmental and health
concerns related to industry practices. The Comment concludes by suggesting
that states should impose more stringent and transparent reporting regulations
on fracking operations, and that directors of these large oil organizations should
make certain changes to their own documentation habits in order to proactively,
as opposed to reactively, minimize the potential for future litigation and
damages.
I.

BACKGROUND: IN RE CLOVIS ONCOLOGY INC.

Clovis Oncology is a relatively small “biotechnology company focused on
acquiring, developing and commercializing cancer treatments in the United
States, Europe and other international markets.” 1 The company was founded in
2009, and within five years was conducting itself in a way that exemplified

1

CLOVIS ONCOLOGY, https://clovisoncology.com/about/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
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flawed business practices. 2 The “Relevant Period”, as defined by the complaint,
spans from “February 26, 2014, through the initiation of . . . litigation.” 3 The
behavior of the directors, and the courts treatment thereof, is particularly
pertinent to this Comment.
“During the Relevant Period,. Clovis had no drugs on the market but did
have three drugs in development. Of these, Roci was the most promising.” 4 Cash
flow into the company was marginal, if any occurred at all, and as such “Clovis
‘reli[ed] solely on investor capital for all operations.’” 5 The company anticipated
that Roci would be profitable, but members of Clovis’ Board knew the only way
to secure a sizable return would be to obtain FDA approval of the drug, Roci. 6
“[T]he Board was hyper-focused on the drug’s development and clinical
trial . . . [and members of the] Board . . . were ‘regularly apprised’ of the drugs
progress.” 7 For approval by the FDA, “new drugs like Roci . . . must prove their
efficacy and safety in clinical trials.” 8 Such trials were designed to track “the
percentage of patients who experience meaningful tumor shrinkage when treated
with the drug.” 9 These numbers are known within the field as “ORR”, or “the
objective response rate.” 10 Members of the Board knew that in order to generate
public excitement, encourage investor participation, and guarantee FDA
approval, Clovis’ ORR numbers would have to be promising.
[T]hroughout the Relevant Period, Clovis’ press releases, investor calls,
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings and statements to medical
journals reinforced the belief that Clovis was reporting a confirmed ORR of
about 60%. . . .” 11 Meanwhile, “the Board received reports indicating Clovis
was improperly calculating Roci’s ORR.” 12 For months Clovis continued to
produce and publish inflated efficacy numbers, and reported the same values to
the FDA. “The conflicting reports regarding Roci’s ORR eventually prompted
the FDA to ask questions and to call for a meeting with Clovis executives. . . .” 13
Shortly thereafter [t]he public was finally informed of Roci’s true ORR
2
3

Id.
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *5 n.13 (Del. Ch. Oct.1,

2019).
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Id. at *5.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
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when . . . Clovis issued a press release stating the correct confirmed ORR was
as low as 28-34%.” 14 Following these revelations the company’s stock value
plummeted “70%, wiping out more than $1 billion in market capitalization.” 15
A few months later “the FDA voted to delay action on Clovis’ . . .” new drug
application, prompting the stock price to fall an additional 17%. 16 Yet, Clovis’
problems did not end there.
“In addition to the Company’s refusal to properly report ORR, the Board
was advised that Roci had serious, undisclosed side effects and that the . . . trial
had been compromised by other clinical trial protocol violations during the
Relevant Period.” 17 The Board of directors was aware “that one of the drug’s
side effects, QT prolongation, was more common than management publicly
reported. Specifically, the Board received a report . . . that a grade 3 out of 4
(indicating a severe response) QT prolongation occurred in 6.2% of patients.” 18
Such was very misleading to prospective consumers and investors, because it
appeared to promise a drug with “manageable side effect[s]”, which was
inaccurate. 19 A series of class actions suits arose against Clovis directors, all of
which alleged securities fraud. 20 “One of these cases was settled for $142 million
in cash and Clovis stock.” 21 A derivative suit, followed, in which shareholders
alleged rampant breaches of fiduciary duties on behalf of the directors of the
corporation. 22 In particular, shareholders alleged that the reporting was
inaccurate and insufficient in violation of the duty of care. 23 Seeking recovery
for losses, the plaintiffs successfully brought forth a Caremark claim based on
those allegations, which is the foundation for this Comment’s suggestions.
II. INTRODUCTIONS
A. Introduction to Fiduciary Duties
The business judgement rule (BJR) is a presumption that in making business
decisions, directors and officers act on an informed basis and in good faith, i.e.,

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *21–22.
Id.
Id.
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in the honest belief that their actions are in the best interest of the company. 24
The BJR protects directors and officers of corporations from liability when they
make honest mistakes, but it cannot protect against all liability.
A fiduciary duty exists when one enters into an agency relationship, which
is established by mutual agreement. 25 In the context of businesses, this is often
exemplified by a manifestation of consent by a principal to an agent that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and shall be subject to the principal’s
control. 26 Consent of the agent to this arrangement is also necessary, though it
is important to acknowledge that an agency relationship can be established
without a formal contract. 27 In large corporations, typically the officers and
managers of the companies act as agents, while the board of directors hold the
position of principal.
In managing a business, particularly one that is publicly traded, business
decision makers owe a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of good faith
to those who are shareholders of the corporation and the public. 28 A breach of
the duty of care is exemplified by an officer or director who makes uninformed
decisions or fails to conduct adequate oversight of business practices. 29 A breach
of the duty of loyalty is slightly different, an illustration of which would
resemble a director or officer whom competes with their own corporation, usurps
a corporate opportunity, or completes a conflict of interest transaction. 30 In
contrast, “[t]he duty of good faith stands for the principle that directors and
officers of a corporation in making all decisions in their capacities as corporate
fiduciaries, must act with a conscious regard for their responsibilities as
fiduciaries.” 31 That being said, “[a] violation of the duty of good faith may
include an intentional derelict in the usual duties of an director or officer,
intentionally acting for a purpose other than the benefit of the corporation, or
intentionally violating the law.”32 While “there is no private shareholder right of
action for a violation of the duty of good faith, its violation may also raise a

24
DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET. AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 233–34 (West Academic et al. eds., 5th ed. 2019).
See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
25
Id. at 2–21.
26
Id. at 227.
27
Id. at 225–40.
28
Id. at 227–29, 237, 240–41, 260–61.
29
Id. at 240–41.
30
Id. at 260–95
31
Duty of Good Faith, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/duty_of_good_faith (last
visited Jan. 22, 2020).
32
Id.
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claim under the duty of loyalty.” 33 Should any of these events occur, harm to the
corporation and its shareholders is presumed, and the business entity itself may
consequently sue the breaching director. Such is a process known as a derivative
suit, in which the shareholders sue to vindicate the corporation. 34 If there has
been a breach of these fiduciary duties, the BJR will not protect directors or
officers from liability. Given the intricate relationship between these obligations
and corporate officials, it would seem logical to assume these duties apply in
equal force across all corporations, whether a thriving multinational oil and gas
corporation, or a pharmaceutical company. A derivative suit is the exact remedy
sought by the shareholders of the Clovis nightmare, and the duties imposed on
directors of large companies are central to this entire piece. For that reason, this
brief introduction was necessary before further analysis of a Caremark claim
could be completed.

B. Introduction to Caremark
In re Caremark provides a framework with which courts can analyze the
conduct, or lack thereof, of officers in the course of their employment. To be
clear, courts have held that in order “to satisfy the[ir] duty of loyalty, directors
must make a good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then
monitor it.” 35 Such a requirement is especially true when the company operates
in a highly regulated industry, or “when the company is operating in the midst
of ‘mission critical’ regulatory compliance risk[s]”. 36 In analyzing an officer’s
or agent’s breach of a duty of care, more specifically for failing to provide
adequate oversight, In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig. suggests a two-part
analysis. 37 “The so-called first prong of Caremark requires Plaintiff’s to wellplead that the Board ‘completely fail[ed] to implement any reporting or
information system or control[s].” 38 By requiring a “well-plead [showing of] bad
faith to survive dismissal—i.e., allegations ‘the directors knew that they were
not discharging their fiduciary obligations,’ [the] standard of wrongdoing [is]
qualitatively different from, and more culpable than . . . gross negligence.” 39
“Implicit in these standards is the requirement that plaintiff’s plead particular
facts allowing a reasonable inference the directors acted with scienter, which
33

Id.
See BUSINESS STRUCTURES, Supra note 22 at 304.
35
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 809, 824.
37
See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
38
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *29.
39
Id. at *26 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)).
34
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‘requires proof that a director acted inconsistent with his fiduciary duties and,
most importantly, that the director knew he was so acting.” 40 However, this is
not the sole justification upon which one may bring a derivative suit for failure
to oversee business activities.
“Caremark’s second prong is implicated when it is alleged the company
implemented an oversight system, but the board failed to ‘monitor it.’ To state a
claim under this prong, Plaintiffs must well-plead that a ‘red flag’ of noncompliance waived before the Board Defendants, but they chose to ignore it.” 41
Such “red flags are only useful when they are either waived in one’s face or
displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.” 42 This second prong
was particularly relevant to the decision of In re Clovis Oncology Inc. because,
as the court determined, the board members of the pharmaceutical company had
“consciously ignored red flags that revealed a mission critical failure to comply
with . . . protocol and associated FDA regulations.” 43 Given the current trend
towards heightened environmental awareness and concern, large fracking
companies would be well-advised to heed the warnings issued by the Clovis
opinion. As the population becomes more aware of fracking’s potentially
catastrophic effects, demands for regulation and documentation will likely grow.
Proactively changing reporting requirements could save many executives and
corporations millions in the foreseeable future.
III. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
A. Background
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as “fracking”, is a process
whereby companies extract natural gas from below the earth’s surface. The
process involved in fracking is important to understand because its invasive
nature and effects are particularly relevant to this Comment and its underlying
argument.
The Environmental Protection Agency of the United States, henceforth
referred to as the EPA, has explained that “[t]he hydraulic fracturing water cycle
has five stages . . .,” which include: 1) water acquisition, 2) chemical mixing, 3)

40
Id. citing In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (citing Stone,
911 A.2d at 370)(emphasis in original) (emphasis added).
41
Id. at 29–30 (emphasis added).
42
Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (internal citations omitted); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig.,
2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2003) (internal citations omitted).
43
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293, at *32.
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well injection, 4) produced water handling, and 5) wastewater disposal and reuse.” 44 A surge in this process “occurred when hydraulic fracturing was
combined with directional drilled technologies around [the year] 2000.
Directional drilling allows oil and gas production wells to be drilled horizontally
or directionally along the targeted rock formation, exposing more of the oil- or
gas-bearing rock formation to the production well.” 45
Wells are plunged several miles under the ground, and simultaneously
casings made of cement and steel are inserted to prevent leaks into
groundwater. 46 Once the well reaches the desired location, which is typically a
layer of sandstone wedged between two layers of shale, the well curves
horizontally. 47 Fracking begins by forcing plastic balls down the wells, and these
balls open sleeves in the pipe to expose holes. 48 A mixture of fluid, sand, and
chemicals is then inserted down the well at an extremely high pressure. 49 This
mixture shoots through the holes in the pipe and fractures the rock, releasing oil
which flows up the well. 50
Several large, publicly traded corporations participate in fracking in the
United States, including but not limited to Chevron Corp. (CVX), ExxonMobil
Corp. (XOM), ConocoPhillips Co. (COP), and Halliburton (HAL). 51 The EPA
estimates that “between 25,000 and 30,000 new wells were drilled and
hydraulically fractured in the United States each year between 2011 and 2014”. 52
Used fluid, which contains toxic materials, flows up the well with the oil that is
collected. Some of that fluid is recycled, while the rest is pumped into disposal
wells located below groundwater. 53 EPA recognizes that “[b]etween 2000 and
2013, approximately 3,900 public water systems were estimated to have had at
least one hydraulically fractured well within 1 mile of their water source; these
public water systems served more than 8.6 million people year-round in 2013.” 54

44
EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water
Resources, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/hfstudy (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
45
Id.
46
Caryl-Sue Micalizio, How Hydraulic Fracturing Works, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/media/how-hydraulic-fracturing-works/.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Fracking Companies on the Verge of Prosperity, MONEY MORNING, https://moneymorning.com/newgold/fracking-companies-on-the-verge-of-prosperity/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
52
EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water
Resources, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/hfstudy (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
53
Micalizio, supra note 44.
54
EPA, supra note 50.
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IV. FRACKING: REGULATION AND IMPACTS
A. Regulation of the Industry
Very few reporting obligations are imposed on fracking activity, and the
majority of those that do exist tend to be based on state law. Such is problematic
as it leaves room for exploitation of natural resources, and destruction of natural
habitats.
1. Regulation at the Federal Level
The EPA imposes federal regulations on the production and exploitation of
natural resources. The development of oil and gas “is primarily regulated under
eight federal environmental and public health laws . . . [which] apply to drilling
and hydraulic fracturing from unconventional sources.” 55 Several exemptions
and limitations to these standards exist, leading to considerably “less oversight
of oil and natural gas development. . . . ” 56 The following analysis of the rules
and regulations specifically pertinent to hydraulic fracturing highlights their
deficiency as currently written and enforced.
a. Clean Water Act (CWA)
“The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
program controls water pollution by regulating point sources that discharge
pollutants into waters of the United States.” 57 This program seeks to regulate
“the types and amounts of pollutants that industrial sites, industrial wastewater
treatment facilities, and municipal wastewater treatment facilities can discharge
into the nation’s surface waters.” 58 Additionally, the CWA imposes “spill
reporting and spill preventions and response planning requirements,” commonly
referred to as the “Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC)
rule[s].” 59

b. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
The “EPA regulates the injection of fluids underground through the

55
Regulations and Exemptions, TIPP OF THE MITT WATERSHED COUNCIL, https://www.watershedcouncil.
org/hydraulic-fracturing—-regulations-and-exemptions.html (last visited Nov.25, 2019).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program.” 60 While this would presumably
protect water sources from fracking pollutants, “[i]n 2005, the Energy Policy
Act amended the SDWA to specifically exempt hydraulic fracturing from the
UIC program, except in instances where diesel fuel is injected as part of the
hydraulic fracturing [process].” 61 This is particularly troubling, given the
likelihood that many other pollutants could be involved in the process aside from
diesel fuel including, but not limited, to hydrochloric acid, formaldehyde,
acetaldehyde and methanol. 62
c. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
Perhaps the most disturbing and faulty regulation is that of the RCRA. While
the Act stipulates that “[n]on-exempt wastes present at well sites may be
regulated as hazardous”, it also points out that “[o]il and gas exploration and
production wastes [are] not regulated as hazardous waste”. 63 This exception has
been in place since the year 1980, during which “the Solid Waste Disposal Act
Amendments exempted drilling fluids, produced water, and other wastes
associated with the exploration, development, or production of oil and gas well
from being regulated as hazardous waste.” 64 Consequently, even “if a waste
exhibits hazardous characteristics, wastewater including flowback . . . from oil
and gas wells is exempt from the . . . provisions under RCRA.” 65
d. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)
The “CERCLA requires operators of oil and gas sites to report releases of
hazardous substances above reportable quantities to the National Response
center. However, releases of petroleum and petroleum products are excluded.” 66
What is even more troubling is that “[t]he liability and reporting provisions also
do not apply to injections of fluids authorized by state law for production,
enhanced recovery, or produced water.” 67

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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e. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
The EPCRA contains a “chemical storage reporting provision [which]
requires facilities storing or using hazardous or extremely hazardous chemicals
over certain thresholds to submit an inventory report including detailed chemical
information to state and local emergency planning authorities.” 68 This Act is
designed to give “individuals and their communities . . . access to information
regarding storage or release of certain chemicals within their communities.” 69
This is relevant for fracking practices because several chemicals utilized by large
oil and gas companies would fall within this category, including but not limited
to the following: hydrochloric acid, formaldehyde, acetaldehyde, methanol,
acetic acid, sodium hydroxide, and acrylamide. 70 The Act attempts to make the
information available to the public by creating “the Toxics Release
Inventory . . ., [h]owever, oil and gas well sites are not required to report to
TRI.” 71
2. Regulation at the State Level
While much of fracking regulation is left up to the states, many neglect to
address the issue and welcome the practice as a financial opportunity. As of
2012, “fourteen U.S. states [had] existing hydraulic fracturing disclosure
requirements. The states with disclosure requirements in effect [were]: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
However, there [was] confirmed fracking activity in at least twenty-nine
states.” 72 Oklahoma has since established reporting requirements of its own, and
yet as the years go by the amount of information distributed to the public and
given to government agencies remains the same—minimal 73
Many of large companies find loopholes to privatize their reported
information, with only seven of those previously mentioned states having
mandated publicly accessible disclosure information: Alabama, Arkansas,

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. (emphasis added).
72
Matthew McFeeley, State Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rules and Enforcement: A Comparison,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (July, 2012), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/FrackingDisclosure-IB.pdf.
73
Id.; see also Liz Hampton, Oklahoma’s New Fracking Guidelines Aim to Reduce Quake Risk, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oklahoma-quake-rules/oklahomas-new-fracking-guidelines-aimto-reducequake-risk-idUSKBN1492R6 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
69
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Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Texas and Wyoming. 74 Four of those seven states
consistently left information blank on their reporting documents, or claimed that
disclosure was unnecessary because of the protection of “trade secret
exemptions” that exist in the majority of states where fracking occurs. 75 Even
more frightening are the results of a recent Natural Resources Defense Council
(the “NRDC”) study, in which the non-profit organization successfully revealed
many of the negligible reporting requirements in place at the state level. 76 The
following graph exemplifies the lack of transparency in reporting within fifteen
states. 77 It is particularly troubling that this refers specifically to nugatory
disclosure of wastewater disposal practices, which involves potentially toxic
wastes being resubmitted into the environment.

All of this information becomes relevant when one stops to consider the
potential consequences of minimally regulated industries that are
environmentally invasive.
V. IMPACTS OF FRACKING: WHY PEOPLE SHOULD CARE ABOUT
MINIMAL REPORTING
Hydraulic fracturing affects several aspects of life. Whether the process
serves a benefit or introduces a risk depends on the vantage point from which
one analyzes the practice. This Comment takes the position that fracking’s
negative impacts outweigh its benefits, and as such it should be considered a
highly regulated industry “operating in the midst of ‘mission critical’ regulatory
compliance risk[s].” 78

74
75
76
77
78

McFeeley, supra note 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 824 (Del. 2019).
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A. Fiscal Concerns
1. Boom Towns
Fracking generates jobs and helps reduce domestic reliance on international
resources. However, all of these benefits come with repercussions. As with many
resource focused industries, hydraulic fracturing produces boomtowns, in which
“a lot of towns becom[e] suddenly wealthy, but as oil and gas prices fell, those
industries dried up.” 79 Additionally, when the resources themselves run dry,
large corporations have the ability to pack up and move to another location while
many of their employees are left behind. As one gentleman summarized, “oil
helped the little person who was trying to get ahead,’ Gomez told VICE. ‘But
then at the end it left them back where they’re at.” 80
2. Debt and Insecurity for Shareholders
Bethany McLean, author of the book Saudi America: The Truth About
Fracking and How It’s Changing the World and a New York Times article titled
The Next Financial Crisis Lurks Underground, along with Jyoti Thottam, a
business and economics editor for the New York Times, both participated in a
podcast discussion about the adverse financial impacts hydraulic fracturing can
produce. 81 The discussion, facilitated by members of the University of
Pennsylvania, focused heavily on the fact that many of the largest fracking
companies in the United States have a track record of not making any money.
“In fact, North American exploration and production companies saw their net
debt balloon from $50 billion in 2005 to nearly $200 billion by 2015, according
to a recent research paper by Amir Azar, fellow at Columbia University’s Center
on Global Energy Policy.” 82 Even more surprising were the parallels McLean
drew “between the fracking industry and the [famous] Enron scandal in that both
feature larger-than-life characters and disconnects between claims the
companies make and their financial statements.” 83 McLean is quoted as having
said: “[w]hen you look at oil companies’ presentations, there’s something that
doesn’t make sense because they show their investors these beautiful investor
decks . . . indicating that they will produce an 80% or 60% internal rate of return.

79
Peter Moskowitz, When Oil Boomtowns Go Bust, VICE (July 3, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.vice.
com/en_us/article/xdm854/when-oil-boomtowns-go-bust.
80
Id.
81
Could Fracking Debt Set off Big Financial Tremors?, WHART. UNIV. OF PA., https://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-fracking-industry-debts-set-off-financial-tremors/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
82
Id.
83
Id.
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And then you go to the corporate level and you see that the company isn’t
making money. . . .” If there are minimal returns, if any at all, why do people
continue to invest? As McLean explains, it is probably because “investors are
valuing fracking companies on non-traditional metrics, such as ‘a multiple of the
acreage they own, or on the basis their production growth, rather than looking at
their cash flow or their profits.’” 84 While it is acceptable to use a variety of
matrices in determining whether to invest, typically investors will demand a
return at some point which will be a difficult request to fulfill if we see a
continuation the business practices as they currently stand. In fact, “[o]f the 20
U.S. oil companies that focus mostly on fracking, only five managed to generate
more cash than they spent in the first quarter” of 2013. 85 These numbers should
function as a warning to investors. Maybe the fracking industry is not as secure
or profitable as the reported numbers might lead one to believe.
3. Cost of Environmental Rehabilitation
Given the invasive nature of the hydraulic fracturing process, environmental
restoration is often necessary throughout the process and after it has been
completed. The costs are staggering, with the EPA estimating that the cost of air
sparging alone could range from $150,000 to $350,000 per acre. 86 Such
estimates were reported in 2004 and would likely be higher now given
inflation. 87 “Methane contamination of well water poses a risk of explosion and
is often addressed by removing it from water at the point of use. In Dimock,
Pennsylvania, Cabot Oil & Gas reporting having spent $109,000 on methane
removal systems for 14 local households” alone. 88 Several of these costs have
been adopted by the companies who produce the problems, but such penalties
are typically the result of a court ruling or an investigation. Such would indicate
that people who had suffered to the benefit of these large corporations were
forced to utilize the judicial processes to seek compensation, which is both
timely and expensive.
Aside from the private costs, there are those attributable to the increase in
earthquakes associated with hydraulic fracturing. In 2016, the United States

84

Id.
Christopher M. Matthews & Bradley Olson, Oil is Above $70, but Frackers Still Struggle to Make
Money, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/oils-at-70-but-frackers-still-struggling-to-make-money1526549401 (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
86
Tony Dutzik et al., The Costs of Fracking, ENV’T Ohio RES. & POL’Y CENTER, https://www.
ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Costs-of-Fracking-vOH.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
87
Id.
88
Id.
85

WHITEFINAL_5.5.20

120

5/5/2020 1:45 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 7

Geological Survey (the “USGS”) released a map which documents increased
seismic activity below the earth’s surface. 89

Mark Petersen, head of the mapping project, went on to say that “most of the
quakes are attributable to wastewater disposal from oil and gas drilling. The
water is injected deep into the ground below drinking water aquifers. The
increased pressure from the water can cause local faults . . . to slip, causing
earthquakes.” 90 Taking Oklahoma, for example, with an estimated 500
magnitude-3 earthquakes in 2016 alone. 91 Scott Harvey, assistant professor at
the Oklahoma University School of Civil Engineering, has said that “[t]he larger
earthquakes—magnitude 4.0 and larger—have the potential to damage
structures. . . .” 92 Many individuals in places like Oklahoma were being forced
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to try to obtain compensation from their own insurance companies, which often
failed because, as “[t]he Oklahoma Department of Insurance says on its
website . . .[,] houses built with brick or rock are not usually covered under
standard earthquake insurance, or sometimes not at all.” 93 Large oil companies
in these situations “refuse to provide aid or take responsibility for their
actions.” 94 As such, if the individuals seek indemnification they must proceed
with a judicial process to be awarded damages. Holding each corporation
accountable in such a way is made significantly more difficult by the lack of
information available to the public because of negligible reporting requirements.
B. Environmental Concerns
1. Environmental Health
Though fracking has been used with relative frequency over the last few
decades, little is known about the long-term effects of horizontal drilling on the
environment. The following is by no means an exhaustive list of the concerns
raised by various environmentalist groups: contamination of groundwater,
methane pollution, exposure to toxic chemicals, waste disposal, frackinginduced earthquakes, infrastructure degradation, and workplace safety. 95
Additionally, “[f]racking’s consumption of water is rising quickly at a time when
much of the United States is suffering from drought” 96, and [t]he loss of a
recreational or commercial fishery due to spills, excessive withdrawals of water,
or changes in water quality caused by the cumulative effects of fracking . . .can
have devastating impacts on local businesses. 97 “Widespread land clearance for
fracking jeopardizes the ability of the forest to continue to produce . . . valuable
services.” 98 Perhaps the biggest long-term environmental effect of fracking
relates to pollution of the atmosphere. “Fracking’s primary impact on the climate
is through the release of methane, which is a far more potent contributory to
global warming than carbon dioxide.” 99 In addition to biosphere impacts,
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biological concerns exist for those who are exposed to fracking activity or its
waste.
2. Human Health
A new study published in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Global
Public Health linked fracking to preterm births, high-risk pregnancies, asthma,
migraine headaches, fatigue, nasal and sinus symptoms and skin disorders. 100
Additionally, “[c]hemical components of fracking fluids . . . have been linked to
cancer, endocrine disruption, and neurological and immune system
problems.” 101 One example of such issues comes from part of Pennsylvania in
which “residents living near one fracking well site . . . complained of rashes,
blisters and other health effects that they attribute to a wastewater
impoundment.” 102 What exacerbates these troubling facts is the fact that “[t]he
legal system offers little relief for those whose health is impacted by chemically
tainted air or water.” 103 Even if a sick individual were to attempt judicial process
to seek retribution against those fracking companies, the process is extremely
complex, takes significant time and money, and the burden of proof is relatively
high as the plaintiff must prove both that “he or she has been exposed to a
specific toxic chemical linked to the health effects that they are experiencing and
that the exposure was caused by the defendant. . . .” 104 Causation can be difficult
to prove in the simplest of cases, making cases in which local and federal statutes
allow for the privatization of information and minimal reporting that much more
difficult.
VI. RECAPITULATION AND ANALYSIS
The decision of In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation serves as
another “reminder to directors of their duty of oversight obligations.” 105 While
it may be difficult to immediately see similarities between pharmaceutical and
fracking corporations, it should be reiterated that the fiduciary duties imposed
100
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on directors and agents are universal. That being said, irrespective of field,
administrators have legal obligations to make informed decisions, oversee
operations and business practices, and to conduct one’s self in a manner suitable
to the best interest of the corporation and investors. 106 Despite the fact that
current regulations permit negligible disclosure with respect to fracking,
continued public interest and heightened concern about environmental stability
should encourage these companies to get ahead of trends and develop more
transparent strategies regarding documentation and reporting.
Concerns surrounding the hydraulic fracturing industry are growing rapidly,
with suits being filed throughout the country seeking damages and information.
Some of these suits relate specifically to the adverse environmental effects of
fracking, while others relate to the unfulfilled promises of financial gain. Take,
for example, a developing situation in Louisiana. The “[f]ormer Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., Esq., a partner at the law firm of Kahn
Swick & Foti, LLC (“KSF”), announce[d] that KSF has commenced an
investigation into Oasis Petroleum Inc. (NYSE:OAS).”107 The investigation
focuses primarily “on whether Oasis’ officers and/or directors breached their
fiduciary duties to Oasis’ shareholders or otherwise violated state or federal
laws.” 108 These concerns extend beyond members of the public who are
completely uninvolved in the practice of fracking, and are shared by members
within the oil and gas business.
Steve Schlotterbeck, who led drilling company EQT as it expanded to
become the nation’s largest producer of natural gas in 2017 109, spoke at a
conference in Pittsburg. During his presentation, he candidly informed the
audience of his opinion on the industry, stating that: “[t]he shale gas revolution
has frankly been an unmitigated disaster for any buy-and-hold investor in the
shale gas industry with very few limited exceptions.” 110 This opinion is
supported by the numbers as well with “spending outweigh[ing] income for a
group of 29 large public shale gas companies by $6.7 billion in 2018, bringing
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the groups 2010 to 2018 cash flow to a total of negative $181 billion. . . .” 111
This information should be alarming to many, including investors and legislators
alike. Those with the ability to create legally enforced standards should
recognize this as an opportunity to protect their constituents by requiring
accountability and candor in reporting by fracking companies.
As discussed previously, the regulations and mandated reporting imposed on
hydraulic fracturing companies is marginal and allows for several exemptions
on the basis of “trade secrets” privilege. These policies expose Americans to
risk, both financial and physical. It is also true that as the law currently stands,
“[t]he oil and gas industry is unlikely ever to be held accountable for many of
the costs of fracking. . . .” 112 As the industry grows, the precariousness of the
situation does too, and many legislators could benefit from initiating new
programs to ensure safe disposal of toxic wastewater. Such would require more
stringent and transparent reporting in an effort to better protect the American
citizenry and would also likely necessitate a new governmental body to oversee
and monitor business practices. ‘If fracking is to continue, the minimum that
citizens should expect is the enforcement of tough rules to reduce fracking
damage and up-front financial assurances that guarantee that the oil and gas
industry cleans up the damage it does cause and compensates any victims.” 113
This is a highly politicized issue and will likely take time before coming to
fruition. That being said, many fracking companies could protect themselves
from future liability by implementing new reporting requirements proactively.
Many would agree that executing new reporting and cultural standards
within a company is easier without the stress of penalty. The directors of these
large fracking organizations are aware of their fiduciary duties to the public,
shareholders, and in overseeing company behavior to ensure the safest execution
of business practices possible. 114 The insufficient current regulations have
created “a disincentive for the industry to take action to prevent accidents and
environmental contamination”, and have resulted in a public citizenry that is
uninformed and unable to access information that could be vital to their health
and financial security. 115 As the public becomes more aware of this, and as

111
Id. (referencing a March 2019 report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis)
(emphasis added).
112
Tony Dutzik et al., The Costs of Fracking, ENV’T Ohio RES. & POL’Y CENTER, https://www.
ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Costs-of-Fracking-vOH.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
113
Id.
114
DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET. AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 225-44 (West Academic et al. eds., 5th ed. 2019).
See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
115
Dutzik, supra note 108.

WHITEFINAL_5.5.20

2020]

5/5/2020 1:45 PM

FRACKING WITH FIDUCIARY DUTIES

125

incidents of health problems and environmental destruction increase, the
demand for revelations and accountability on behalf of the corporations and the
directors will likely surge. Addressing this internally and proactively would
likely insulate companies that trade in shale, and the directors who run them,
from liability. This would be a particularly advantageous approach for an
industry that has a lengthy reputation for being unprofitable.
VII. SUGGESTION ABRIDGED
Executive officials within large oil and gas corporations should take action
to get ahead of regulatory changes. An effort to become more transparent with
the public, investors and the government would recharacterize fracking
companies as contributing corporate entities as opposed to organizations that are
self-serving at the expense of the uninformed American. Assuring disclosure
would protect individual directors, officers, and corporations from potential
litigation, and could alleviate many of the concerns residents and investors share.
Furthermore, state legislatures and the federal government would be well
advised to implement heightened reporting requirements as an attempt to curtail
all of the potentially catastrophic environmental, biological, and fiscal effects of
unregulated oil extraction.
CONCLUSION
Investors and consumers alike were initially excited about the opportunities
fracking presented. The potential adverse effects from hydraulic fracturing are
alarming, much like those associated with underperforming drugs targeted at
cancer cells. In order for directors, irrespective of their field of work, “to satisfy
their duty of loyalty, [they] must make a good faith effort to implement an
oversight system and then [actually] monitor it.” 116 In order to do so, fracking
companies would benefit substantially from executing a more stringent reporting
and documenting practice.
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